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he CEPS Carbon Market Forum (CMF) feels that the clean development mechanism (CDM) 
has reached a very important moment and that the reflection undertaken through the High-
Level Panel on CDM Policy Dialogue and its report entitled “A call to action”1 are important 
elements in the debate on the future orientation of this mechanism.  
The CEPS CMF has been supportive of this initiative and hosted two events for the HLP to interact 
with the Brussels community. Through this note, CEPS would like to provide its reflections on the 
report, as well as, by extension, its views on the future of the CDM.  
The clean development mechanism (CDM) has been through a long and complex growing process 
since it was approved as part of the Kyoto Protocol (KP). It was designed within the framework of 
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, and reflected the political and economic realities of that 
time.  
It  has proven  to  be more successful  than  many  observers may  have  expected.  Among  its  key 
successes, one should acknowledge that the CDM has: 
  Successfully harnessed the entrepreneurial power of markets and the private sector to meet 
sustainable development goals and environmental targets;  
  Demonstrated how  culture  can  be  changed  around  the  world  by  putting  a  value  on  GHG 
reduction actions;  
  Mobilised more capital for GHG mitigation actions, especially from the private sector, than 
many established IFIs;  
  Provided lessons learned and established standards that were useful for its own improvement, 
as well as for the design of new market mechanisms around the world; 
  Established a link between different domestic markets; 
  Served as a splendid example of a public-private partnership and 
  Built capacity to address climate change around the world.  
Through improvements over the last ten years, sometimes unnecessarily slow and painful, the 
CDM has now reached a point where it is beginning to function in a reasonably efficient way, 
under the guidance of a regulatory body, the CDM Executive Board (EB), which has also matured.  
One of the lessons learned must be that a regulator, like the CDM EB, while in some ways unique, 
does  not  need  to  reinvent  tried  ways,  and  should  use  the  experience  accumulated  through 
regulation around the world.  
The political and regulatory premises upon which the CDM was designed and built have changed 
dramatically. As such its orientation, role and functions must be revisited. The new developments 
that must be taken into account include: 
                                                   
1 Download report at http://www.cdmpolicydialogue.org/report/rpt110912.pdf 
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  The CDM was conceived as an offset provider. That approach is not acceptable anymore; we 
need net reductions. 
  The  source  of  demand,  which  has  been  the  EU  and  Japan,  has  decided  to  severely  limit, 
through regulatory intervention, the demand for certified emissions reductions (CERs). 
  The economic situation over the last few years has led to lower emissions and a long position 
for emission permits for the foreseeable future 
  The CDM was built in a framework of Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries. That framework is 
changing in the post-Cancun world. Providing funds for development was acceptable whereas 
providing funds to support your own competition in difficult economic times is not. 
  With deeper cuts in GHG emissions than the science demands, new mechanisms are needed. 
Some  of  them  will  be  developed  at  the  UN  level,  while  others  will  emerge  from  national 
initiatives. The CDM will lose its ‘monopoly’ and will need to compete in the marketplace of 
ideas based on efficiency and efficacy with other mechanisms. 
  The orderly world of the KP is being replaced by a fragmented and complex world of market 
initiatives. This world will require standards to ensure environmental integrity. 
  Significant financial resources will be deployed in the future to meet adaptation and mitigation 
needs. This will require imaginative ways to leverage private sector finance, which will also 
need access to processes and platforms to identify environmentally credible GHG reduction 
opportunities.   
The questions that need to be answered are: 
  Is there a need for an instrument such as the CDM in the future? 
  What ‘demand’ can it fill? 
  In the roles identified under the first question, what can be done to adapt it and also continue 
to increase its efficacy? 
The Report of the High-Level Panel on CDM Policy Dialogue lists 12 areas of recommendations, 
which can be categorised into the following three groupings: 
  Strategic/existential 
  Credibility/reputational 
  Efficiency/efficacy 
As a pre-condition for any discussion about the CDM, it must be well understood that there must 
be demand for its products and services. It must be said upfront that at this time the CDM suffers 
from  a  decreasing  demand  for  its  services.    The  CDM  produces  CERs  and  there  is  a  clear 
oversupply in the market, leading up to 2020. It is unlikely that the expertise that the CDM has 
created in business and the public sector will survive until demand comes back. 
The Report of the High-Level Panel proposes a number of ways to address the supply/demand 
imbalance. Using the CDM as a supply platform to offer environmentally credible GHG reductions 
that could be used by a Fund looking to deploy funds for mitigation, such as the Green Climate 
Fund (GCF),2 makes eminent sense and is a credible scenario that must be seriously examined. The 
specifications for the products (type of CERs) accepted can be developed by the Fund. There can 
be no expectation of a monopoly for the CDM. 
The second recommendation, the creation of a Reserve Bank, while an intellectually interesting 
proposal, is much more problematic and will face what we see as tremendous challenges. Efforts 
in that direction will require a substantial amount of resources with limited chance of success. 
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Issues and Recommendations  
Strategic/Existential  
The CDM will be one of a number of approaches that will emerge in the new fragmented world, 
and will co-exist with other alternatives. Parties will have a choice on the use of these mechanisms. 
Use of any of these instruments will be driven by demand and by the national circumstances. For 
some, as is the case for JI Track 1 and Track 2, Parties may have to fulfil certain criteria. 
The CDM will be available to all Parties to host. Hosting, and accepting CERs for compliance, 
should be, as always, a choice that Parties can make. 
There is no reason why CERs can be available for transfer only to countries that have signed up for 
KP2. It should be available to all Parties that wish to use them for compliance, whether under KP, 
UNFCCC Cancun-type commitments, or national or sub-national regimes that require compliance. 
The vision that Parties will adhere to the KP in order benefit from KP mechanisms, as well as that 
their CC policy is driven by participation in KP mechanisms, is not one that has been validated in 
the past.  
Restricting the use of CDM to KP2 signatories may have unintended consequences, such as:  
  Reducing demand for CERs and making the instrument less viable; 
  Encouraging the development of other market mechanisms that may be less environmentally 
credible and outside the multilateral system; 
  Negatively affecting other roles that the CDM could play and 
  Reducing mitigation efforts, which would be against the objectives of the UNFCCC. 
We do not believe that the CDM and its regulatory bodies are set and prepared to assume the role 
designated  for  the  emerging  New  Market  Mechanisms  (NMMs)  and  Framework  for  Various 
Approaches (FVA), nor it is desirable for them to so at this time. The vision for the emerging new 
mechanisms is very different, covering broad segments of the economy and with a much more 
significant  role  for  national  governments.  The  NMM  should  be  allowed  to  define  their  own 
identity and culture, but building upon the technical knowledge and experience of the CDM.  
Once  the  NMMs  and  the  FVA  are  established,  strong  consideration  should  be  given  to 
amalgamating all mechanisms under one regulatory body. 
Another role advocated by the report is that of standard-setter. Given that many new mechanisms 
will emerge, some top down (UN defined), some bottom up, among the greatest challenges will be 
to  have  fungibility,  environmental  integrity  and  market  liquidity.  Developing,  setting  and 
maintaining common standards will be critical. The CDM has developed a substantial number of 
methodologies and created expertise. While this cannot be always adopted wholesale, it should 
nevertheless be used as the basis for the work that will need to be undertaken. The CDM is a 
project-by-project mechanism, while many of the new additions will be much broader in scope, 
and may require different approaches. 
Credibility/Reputation 
The CDM’s reputation has suffered from criticism on a number of fronts. The most important ones 
have been related to the additionality of its projects, the impact on sustainability and the lack of 
attention to co-benefits. 
Since the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de 
Janeiro, defining sustainable development (SD) priorities has been the prerogative of a sovereign 
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Since promoting SD is one of the two objectives of the CDM, there are strong views that CDM has 
not really promoted SD, and that this should be accomplished through the introduction of an 
assessment of the SD impact of projects.   
Mandating greater transparency is needed and should be welcomed and implemented. On the 
other hand, defining what should be reported and how it is to be measured can easily cross the 
line  into  imposing  definitions  of  SD  on  host  countries.  This  could  set  back  the  sustainability 
agenda by creating the perception, but also maybe the reality, that SD is becoming a way to impose 
foreign standards on host countries. 
Similarly,  host  countries  should,  and  we  expect  that  they  are  already  doing  so,  monitor  the 
implementation of projects in their countries. They should clearly have the option to withdraw the 
Letter  of  Approval  for  any  projects  that  does  not  meet  national  standards  and  national  SD 
objectives. At the same time it must be recognised that the introduction of such a provision will 
introduce a high degree of uncertainty. We are not questioning the appropriateness of such an 
option, but must point out that this will represent not a minor change, but a significant departure, 
from what was one of the CDM’s strengths: international regulation of the CDM cycle. Unless 
safeguards are introduced, this may simply make the CDM, or any future project mechanism, a 
difficult proposition. 
Additionality has always been a hard criticism of the CDM. Through its counterfactual nature, it 
can never be a totally objective process.  As such, uncertainty should be accepted and mitigated 
through the use of standardised approaches. While this approach will not eliminate criticism, it 
will provide more transparency and consistency on how additionality is assessed. Considering 
that  we  need  large  quantities  of  reductions,  this  approach  will  ensure  that  we  produce  real 
reductions within known and accepted material boundaries of uncertainty. 
Increased Efficiency/Efficacy 
“Reform of the CDM” has been a long and arduous process started in Buenos Aires at COP 10 in 
December  2004.  Unfortunately,  what  is  meant  by  reform  can  vary  substantially.  While  some 
include  some  of  the  issues  referred  to  in  the preceding  section, many  others  understand  it  as 
increasing  the  efficiency  and  efficacy  of  the  machine.  Much  progress  has  been  made  in  this 
direction, but it is still not applied in a consistent manner. The regulator, the CDM EB, continues to 
be heavily politicised, with individual members sometimes bringing in national agendas. 
The CDM processes have been simplified and clarified by a good degree. However, it still is, once 
in a while, ignored when it gets in the way of the political agenda. The main remedy lies in the 
choice  of  the  members  of  the  Board  that  are  at  present  closely  connected  to  the  UNFCCC 
negotiating process. 
Selection of the EB should be guided by very stringent rules that should emphasise regulatory 
experience and ensure detachment from the agenda of the UNFCCC negotiating process. Since this 
is a UN body, nominations should still emerge from regional groups, but they should be subject to 
approval by the CMP (Conference of Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol) under clear guidelines defined above. This, combined with terms limits, may contribute 
to creating a less politicised Board. 
Decentralised systems are generally regarded as being a better proposition than heavily centralised 
ones. They are seen as more efficient and better able to respond to national realities. However, this 
must be balanced with the need for consistency and risk reduction. Central issuance of CERs from 
the EB has been one of the successful features of the CDM. By moving that to the national level it 
will alter the reassurance that CERs will be issued according to instructions to the UNFCCC by 
those  authorised  through  contractual  agreements.  Uneven  implementation  of  issuance  and 
destination of issued CERs can ruin the credibility of the instrument. “If it ain’t broken don't fix it.” THE FUTURE OF THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM | 5 
 
Also as part of the governance, an appeals process and grievance mechanism are long-overdue 
necessities. Instructions had been given by the CMP in Copenhagen to develop such a mechanism. 
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